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Abstract 
The paper tries to analyze the tax reforms in new EU member states, and to 
understand how these developments came into existence. Despite several 
commonalities we argue that across country variation is very much present, 
especially in the areas of degree of dependence on indirect taxes as well as the 
share of each component in total tax revenue. Our preliminary evidence indicates 
that there are three identifiable groupings; Hungary, Slovenia and Czech Republic 
as the first, Poland and Slovakia as the second, and the rest of the countries as the 
third. From the clusters we claim that these differences reflect the underlying the 
structural characteristics of the economies, particularly the scope of the informal 
economy and the intensity of competition to attract foreign capital. The paper 
contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it gives a comprehensive 
overview of reforms and possible explanatory factors. Second, it attempts to 
categorize the transition countries according to the features of the tax systems 
adopted. Finally, it establishes a linkage between the informal sector, capital from 
external sources and why particular modifications were implemented.  
 
Keywords: tax, informal economy, foreign investment, transition 
JEL: H24, H25, F21, E26 
 
1. Introduction 
Tax systems contain a complicated set of provisions and standards, and numerous 
economic outcomes are dependent on the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. In 
new EU member states, there have been substantial changes and revisions since the 
beginning of the transition. Although, the pace and the extent of reforms varied greatly 
across countries, all of them experienced major developments both in terms of taxation 
rules and administration of these rules. There were several imperatives that induce these 
countries to radically transform their tax rates, bases, and administration. New fiscal 
institutions were required to cope with a market system as well as to generate enough 
revenues to meet the social expenditures. As argued, the transition countries needed a 
wholesale renewal of tax systems rather than gradual alterations of their fiscal institutions 
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since the previously established institutions were not adequate to function under the new 
economic regime (Tanzi, 1993).  
Before the transition the regime allowed mainly three sources of revenues; 
enterprise, turnover and payroll while taxes on personal incomes were relatively 
negligible (Dabrowski and Tomczynska 2001). The governments received most of their 
income from the earnings of the state owned enterprises, and hence the taxes were not 
playing the crucial role of public finance as they do in modern economies. These 
countries did not have extensive tax administration given that most of the proceedings 
were flowing from large enterprises. Additionally, mono-banking made tax collection 
process to be quite smooth. There were no fixed tax rates or when they existed, they were 
numerous. In general, the government and enterprises negotiated the amount of 
payments. Thus, after transition all the countries needed to radically transform their fiscal 
institutions and particularly the taxation systems.  
The paper tries to analyze the tax reforms in new EU member states, and to 
understand how these developments came into existence. By only looking at the new EU 
member states we try to refrain from the potentially diverse external impacts that can 
exist between the transition countries. There are several commonalities among these 
countries such as the introduction and application of three main conventional tax sources 
– personal, corporate, and value added. Also, more reliance on indirect taxes as the main 
supply of government revenue can be observed in all cases compared to the older EU 
members. However, the share of each component in overall tax revenues and the timing 
of the adaptation of the tax laws and regulations are quite divergent across countries. 
Besides, the dependence on indirect taxes differs substantially from one country to 
another. For example the share of direct taxes in overall tax expenditures reaches to 
31.4% in Lithuania on average for the most recent period while this is approximately 
17% in Bulgaria1 (Eurostat, 2009). Also, the capital income taxes amount to 12.7% of all 
tax revenues in Czech Republic whereas in Estonia this is kept relatively low, around 5% 
for the same period.  
                                                 
1 However, one should note that the ratio of direct taxes to GDP in these two examples is quite similar, 
14.2% in Lithuania and 14.8% in Bulgaria.  
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Our preliminary evidence indicates that there are three identifiable groupings; in 
the first cluster we have Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, in the second one, the Baltic 
States, and in the third cluster the rest of the countries. The first group is characterized by 
a higher share of capital income and a lower share of value added taxes in the overall 
revenues. The second cluster has the highest rates and share of personal income taxes, 
and finally the third cluster mainly relies on taxes on consumption. From the clusters we 
claim that these differences reflect the underlying the structural characteristics of the 
economies, particularly the scope of the informal economy and the intensity of 
competition to attract foreign capital. The paper contributes to the literature in a number 
of ways. First, it gives a comprehensive overview of reforms and possible explanatory 
factors. Second, it attempts to categorize the transition countries according to the features 
of the tax systems adopted. Finally, it establishes a linkage between the informal sector, 
capital from external sources and why particular modifications were implemented.  
Section 2 describes the current situation of taxation systems in these countries and 
situates them against their Western counterparts. In section 3, we look at the informal 
economy, investment incentives and promotions, and their relations to taxation. Section 4 
applies a cluster analysis method to identify similarities and dissimilarities among the 
new member states. Both, components of taxation and related economic outcomes will be 
considered in the analysis. Also, the results of the clustering method are discussed. The 
last section concludes.  
 
2. Taxation Systems in Transition Countries 
This section tries to inspect the developments in tax systems in transition 
countries especially looking at the changes in main sources of revenue; namely labor, 
capital, and value-added taxes. There have been numerous reforms since the start of the 
1990s and these changes varied greatly both in terms of timing and content from one 
country to another. A summary of the timing in each three tax component is provided in 
the appendix. In this section we also incorporate a brief overview of underlying 
macroeconomic conditions, particularly the role of informal economy and governments’ 
attitude towards foreign capital investments, since we claim that these are explanatory for 
the variation across countries.  
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2.1 Labor Income 
During the communist regimes, the labor income tax laws were largely missing, 
and citizens were not ‘tax conscious2. And at the beginning of the transition countries 
adopted a large number of brackets and rates, which generated some confusion and 
increased the difficulty of administration. Almost all countries tried to simplify the 
system throughout 1990s with the exception of Slovenia. Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Romania went to the other extreme and implemented flat rates. The highest 
rates of labor income tax for certain income brackets are in Slovenia and Hungary, 50% 
in the former and 40% in the latter case. Besides cutting down the differential rates the 
countries were also engaged in limiting the tax exemptions and deductions available to 
taxpayers, thus broadening the tax base (Gandullia, 2004).  
With the exception of Baltic States and to a certain extent in Romania and 
Bulgaria there have been numerous and very frequent tax reforms. However, all the 
developments had a unique direction; decreases in taxes on labor income. Most of the 
countries by 2009 adopted flat rates while Hungary, Slovenia and Poland kept their 
differential schemes. Thus, the progressivity of labor income taxes is quite distinct across 
transition countries, flat rate countries being at the bottom of the list. One peculiar feature 
of all changes throughout the period is the relatively low dependence of the fiscal budgets 
on direct taxes. Although many countries established comparable income taxes and caps 
with the more developed nations in the West, over time the share of taxes on labor 
income in total revenues have been declining.  
Although, the implicit tax rate on labor3 is not equivalent to labor income taxes, 
the overall picture might give an idea of the trend of rates in the transition countries. 
Figure 1 shows the fluctuation of average implicit tax rate on labor over the period as 
well as the share of taxes on labor income in total taxes for the period of 1995-2007. In 
1995, the average rate was 38.1% but went down to 35.4%, there was also a decrease in 
the share of the PIT revenues from 17.2% to 15%. The only country that had a rise in the 
                                                 
2 Since the citizens were not directly contributing to the fiscal budget, they were generally now aware of 
their own contributions to the publicly provided services (Kornai, 1997).  
3 According to Eurostat implicit tax rates are calculated as follows: “… a tax rate is calculated by dividing 
the revenues from taxes on a special activity or good by an appropriate corresponding aggregate tax base 
from national accounts statistics”. For more explanation;  
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/coded/info/data/coded/en/gl008798.htm 
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burden on labor is Czech Republic, which has one of the highest rates among all 
countries in the world. One explanation for the higher taxes on personal incomes in 
Czech Republic and to a certain extent in Hungary and Slovenia is the relatively 
extensive social protection policies and welfare state spending.  
 
Figure 1. Implicit Tax Rate on Labor and Share of Labor Income Tax 
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Source: Eurostat and OECD 
 
2.2 Capital Income 
Corporate taxation during the communist era was mostly in the form of enterprise 
profit taxation. Hungary and Poland were the pioneers of reform in this area (McLure, 
1995), many deductions were possible and most of the allowances were negotiated 
between firm owners and government officials. The excess wage taxes4 were quickly 
eliminated in the region. This type of revenue source was not viewed as conducive to 
enterprise growth and innovation. As a result of the big deviation of the earlier techniques 
from what is observed in advanced countries, the transition governments needed to 
restructure their ways of revenue generation via corporations after the transition but 
various countries tried to solve the immediate problems in different fashions. In certain 
                                                 
4 Excess wage taxes are taxes levied on wages that are above the average or commanded levels. The more 
efficient companies suffered more from this type of tax since they are more able to pay excess wages.  
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countries, several rates were introduced while others adopted a single rate such as 
Slovakia and Romania. The highest average implicit tax rate on capital is seen in Czech 
Republic which is approximately 26%. In Estonia the capital is taxed on average for the 
same period by 8.68% only, other countries lie somewhere in the middle. Figure 2 
presents the developments in implicit capital tax rates and shares from 1995 till 2007. As 
can be seen from the below graph, the implicit tax rate on capital has been on a steady 
decline until the first half of 2000s, then a rise is recorded. However, the share of CIT 
revenues is quite stable for the period under consideration.  
 
Figure 2. Implicit Tax Rate on Capital and Share of CIT 
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Source: Eurostat and OECD 
 
Most of the CIT systems made it possible to have considerable deductions and 
exemptions particularly for foreign investors. In this sense, almost every transition 
country pursued policies to attract external capital and designed numerous 
encouragement mechanisms as well as tax subsidies. The literature suggests that most of 
the competition for investment is done via reductions in tax percentages. Rivalry among 
governments to attract capital leads to tax competition and erodes the tax base, which in 
turn reduces the funds for welfare state, and simultaneously shifts taxes onto labour 
(Tanzi 1995). Although the tax rate on labour income is also declining, the cuts in capital 
taxes are relatively greater. Besides the rates, the governments can also have tax holidays 
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and various other investment incentive schemes. The transition countries resorted to all of 
the measures to receive foreign investments especially throughout 1990s, which were cut 
down gradually in couple of nations like Slovakia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Latvia.  
 
2.3 Value Added 
Finally, value added taxation was a completely new preface for the post-
communist nations given that there was much complicated turnover tax system in the pre-
transition period. However, it should be noted that in some countries the transformation 
started already in 1980s. For example in Czechoslovakia in July 1990, negative rates of 
this tax were abolished and only four rates were introduced, replacing the several hundred 
that had been in existence previously (Mitra and Stern, 2004). Many of the reforms in this 
area were completed until the second-half of 1990s. After this date, most of the changes 
observed were about the type and number of goods and services that can be covered by 
reduced rates. Although, VATs are widely used by every government, there are number 
of pitfalls regarding the administrative costs and its regressive character (Raboy and 
Massa, 1989). Since there are EU regulations5 on this domain, the transition countries 
needed to comply with the rules before accepted to become members. Even before the 
accession, the Central European countries followed the EU style VAT rather than the 
Russian method, which was set as a single rate. Additionally, these countries 
implemented excise taxes on several products such as tobacco, alcohol and petroleum.  
On average, the share and rate of indirect taxes are much higher in the region than 
the Western Europe. The highest average implicit tax rate on consumption can be seen in 
Hungary, which is 24.63% while the lowest average rate is recorded in Lithuania, 
approximately 16%. Figure 3 summarizes the over time change in implicit consumption 
tax rates and revenue shares for the same period. From the figure one can observe that the 
rates and shares of this component oscillated much more than the taxes on labor or 
capital. The implicit rate went up to 22.2% in 2007 from 21.7% in 1995 while the 
revenue share rose from 19.3% to 25.3% in the same phase. These numbers are very 
much in line with the arguments in the literature since they clearly show that transition 
countries are putting most of the tax burden on indirect elements.  
                                                 
5 EU regulations on VAT are mainly described by the Directive 2006/112/EC.  
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Figure 3. Implicit Tax Rate on Consumption and Share of VAT 
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Source: Eurostat and OECD 
 
On the whole, the new member states reveal several common features. Firstly, 
they have a higher percentage of indirect taxes than the old member states for every year 
and the gap is increasing. For example in 1995, the average revenue from the indirect 
taxes for the transition group was 39.5% while this was 36.5% in Western Europe. In 
2007, the ratios reached to 41.4% for the new and 37.1% for the old members. Secondly, 
the burden on labor is slightly lower in the transition countries compared to the rest of 
EU; for 2007 the implicit tax rate on labour on average in EU12 was 34.13% while this 
was 36.33% in EU15. Nevertheless, in several countries such as Czech Republic and 
Hungary, the burden on labor is much higher, around 40%, which can be both detected 
from the higher average rates of taxation and social security contributions. Lastly, the 
new member states started with lower capital tax ratios and decreased them even further. 
In Estonia, for instance, the corporation tax on retained earnings has been completely 
abolished6. Many of the old member states like Germany, Italy and France have statutory 
rates between 35-40% while the highest in the transition countries is 25% in Slovenia. 
                                                 
6 Even though the tax on retained earnings have been set at zero in 2000, the statutory tax rate on capital is 
26% and the average effective tax rate is around 22.5% for the most recent years.   
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Despite these commonalities, the transition countries varied significantly in 
choosing the types of the reforms applied to their fiscal institutions as well as balance 
between tax components. We will discuss the country groupings in terms of tax variables 
and probable explanations in section three. Before moving to the statistical analysis, we 
review the extent of the informal sector and reliance on FDI in the region. Also, we 
outline the reasons why the level of shadow economy and range of investment incentives 
can be explanatory for the cross-country groupings. The differing degrees of labor, 
capital, and consumption taxes as well as the balance between revenues from direct and 
indirect sources can be described by the initial constraints in these countries. However, 
contrary to the widespread association between fiscal indicators and taxation systems, we 
affirm that the structural barriers matter most.  
 
3. Informal Economy and Foreign Capital 
In this part we lay out our arguments about why the informal economy and 
foreign capital at the beginning of the transition affected the tax options of the transition 
governments. A larger informal economy and more eagerness for foreign capital would 
lead to lower capital taxes and higher indirect taxes. The shadow economy restricts the 
tax base, and also to motivate participants of these activities to switch back to formal 
sector, the governments decrease the taxes or refrain from elevating costs. For the 
incentives and promotions, the argument is clear. Lower corporate taxes are required to 
be more competitive in the capital markets. In the following parts, we first provide a very 
brief overview of these aspects for the region, and then discuss how they impacted the 
evolution of the tax systems.  
 
3.1 Extent of Informal Economy 
Informal economy can be defined as the “… output and workforce of firms not 
registered with the government as well as the unreported activities and workforce of 
registered firms” (Palmade and Anayiotis, 2005). The size and depth of informal 
economy in several transition countries are widely researched by employing a physical 
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input methodology7 (Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996; Johnson et al., 1997; Lacko, 2000). 
In this methodology, the degree of informality is gauged by subtracting the amount of 
electricity needed to produce the official national income from total electrical output. 
However, the measurement and usage of estimates based on strict assumptions are all 
debated in the literature. Either the cash demand or electricity consumption approaches 
are deficient in identifying the true extent of informal or shadow economy. For example 
even when the difference between the electricity that is required for formal activities and 
total consumption is estimated, this figure needs to be converted into value added figures, 
which requires very strong assumptions. Alexeev and Pyle (2003) and Belev (2003) 
affirmed that the previously mentioned studies look only into the physical attributes and 
largely ignore the historical determinants of these activities. Moreover, the institutions 
coupled with legacies play an important role in shaping the shadow economy. 
Nevertheless, there is an agreement that in many transition countries, the extent of 
informal activity is rather high and in some nations it is even increasing over time.  
Since one of the biggest negative consequences of having a large shadow 
economy is the losses in revenue, there can be dissatisfaction about the amount and 
quality of public goods. This might exacerbate the informality problem if more people 
find the taxes overburdening. In 2007, the estimated size of the informal economy ranged 
from 17.4% of GDP in Slovakia to 39.4% of GDP in Bulgaria (Schneider, 2009). While 
several countries have seen a decline in the unrecorded activities during the transition 
period, the others have experienced expansion in this sector, mainly Romania and 
Bulgaria. The trend in the rest of the new member states was a downward one but the 
highest contraction was around 2.8% in Latvia, which might be considered as relatively 
little. When we compare the average size of informal sector in transition region to 
Western Europe, we can see that there is a big difference. In the former set of countries 
the average size of informal activities reach to 29.77% while this is 16.8% in Western 
Europe (Schneider, 2003).  
The main channel through which the informal sector can influence the tax systems 
is through the deterioration of the base. Starting with a very large shadow economy 
                                                 
7 These studies mainly consider the electricity consumption as a proxy for GDP in a country and estimate 
the size of the shadow economy based on the consumption figures.  
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means that the governments are constrained in raising public revenues since a large 
portion of the incomes –both personal and corporate- are unrecorded. There might be a 
variety of reasons why the informal activity is viewed more lucrative by the individuals 
but once they decide to move to this sector, these individuals no longer can be taxed. 
This, we argue, pushes the governments of these countries to mostly rely on indirect taxes 
and revenue generation via taxing consumption especially when they are not capable of 
raising the attractiveness of formal economy and pulling people back to formal 
employment. In the short run at least, the breadth of the shadow economy partly 
determines the public proceedings and governments are expected to opt for immediate 
solutions such as indirect taxation. Additionally, lower burden on personal and corporate 
incomes can be used to enlarge the tax base since these are expected to give more 
incentives to people to participate in formal markets.  
 
3.2 Investment Incentives and Promotions 
The other major factor that our paper claims to have an influence on tax system is 
the governments’ willingness to attract foreign capital and investment. UNCTAD stated 
that the FDI incentives can be understood as “any measurable advantages accorded to 
specific enterprises or categories of enterprises by (or at the direction of) a Government, 
in order to encourage them to behave in a certain manner” and include 
“measures…designed either to increase the rate of return of a particular FDI undertaking, 
or to reduce (or redistribute) its costs or risks” (UNCTAD, 2000, p. 11). This definition 
points to the fact that governments can undertake various policies to appeal to foreign 
investors and these are different than the overall macroeconomic policies such as the 
fiscal system. Therefore, fiscal and financial incentives such as tax exemptions, 
preferential treatment of profit on exports, investment allowances, cash grants, provision 
of infrastructure and direct subsidies, are all included in the summary measures for 
policies that target more capital inflows. This broad menu of options already signal that 
governments have alternatives and do not have to resort to only tax incentives, however, 
the mobility of capital is argued to strongly increase the tax competition (Winner, 2005).  
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In the case of transition context, FDI is believed to have several additional 
contributions to the growth process. Because capital is scarcer domestically and capitalist 
economic relations are rather new, FDI can foster transition of the economy.  Various 
reasons have been offered to account for the role of FDI in overcoming some of the 
transitional problems. Lavigne (1999) maintains that foreign capital helped to solve the 
restructuring troubles of previously state owned enterprises. Others mentioned the 
technological improvements brought by foreign firms and upgrading of exported 
commodities, compensation of underdeveloped domestic financial markets8, and higher 
investments and advancement of skills, knowledge and managerial expertise (World 
Bank, 2002).  
These countries managed to attract substantial amounts of investment both as a 
percentage of their size and compared to other regions in the world. Czech Republic 
received FDI equal to 6.5% of their GDP on average between 1994 and 2003 (UNCTAD, 
2004). Poland and Hungary also had quite high levels while in Slovenia, the FDI played a 
miniscule role9. This can be partly explained by the incentive and promotion schemes that 
were put in place. The fiscal incentives include tax holidays, exemptions and other 
benefits that the foreign investors enjoy while the financial incentives can range from 
cash grants to preferential credits. Investment promotion agencies, on the other hand, 
provide information and services to the potential investors, and try to sell the country as a 
lucrative place to invest. Countries have applied differential policies to receive foreign 
investments depending on their preferences for incentives, which are mainly fiscal and 
financial versus promotion agencies. For example, in Czech Republic, the promotional 
activities are recorded to be quite high while these are relatively minor in Lithuania, and 
both countries have the same intensity of fiscal and financial incentives for FDI. Besides 
the mixture of the two set of policies, countries also differ in how much they care about 
FDI. Hungary, for instance, scored highest when it comes to fiscal and financial 
incentives among the transition countries while in Estonia, these types of attraction have 
been rather low.  
                                                 
8 For broader explanation on the technological issues and exports see Smith (2000), and for the financial 
market argument, see Gros and Steinherr (1995).  
9 Although, the low FDI in Slovenia can be explained by the few state enterprises for sale, the passive 
promotion policies were also present especially before 2000s.  
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We contain that incentives and promotions for foreign capital clearly indicate the 
governments’ willingness to attract this type of investment, which would lead to lower 
taxes on corporate incomes. Even though the immediate tax rates might not significantly 
alter the flows, they act as a signal to the investors outside and exhibits governments’ 
commitment to stimulating FDI (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000). Also, at the beginning of the 
transition, these countries need additional determination to show the foreign capitalists 
that the uncertainty is low and the country offers significant rewards in excess to risks 
and possible administrative and legal obstacles. However, the governments are 
simultaneously interested in improving domestic investment opportunities and cannot 
heavily tax the national corporations. Therefore, the incentive structures for domestic and 
foreign capital would be harmonized and transition governments would treat corporate 
earnings in a more lax manner. We maintain that stronger policies aimed at foreign 
investment at the start would result in lower tax burden on capital in general and more 
reliance on indirect taxes in particular. 
 
4. Cluster Analysis and Implications 
Two clustering exercises are undertaken to identify the current tax systems’ 
similarities and dissimilarities across countries as well as the possible linkages between 
these variances and structural factors. The higher share of indirect taxes and particularly 
low taxation on capital income can be explained by the informal sector, and incentives 
provided to attract foreign capital. After defining the variables used in the analysis, we 
move to investigate whether a match between the clusters of systems and potential 
underlying factors emerge. The cluster analysis is a well established an accepted method 
to group cases where similarities are minimized while the differences are maximized10. 
Certainly, the analysis is descriptive and explanatory in nature rather than attempting to 
find causal relationships between the variables.  
Any statistical method that aims to classify cases is extremely sensitive to the 
variable selection. Therefore, it is worth to mention which series were used in our 
analysis and the justification for the choice. For the taxation systems we first consider the 
total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP since this measure is the most direct indicator 
                                                 
10 For a detailed explanation on cluster analysis, see He et al., 2005.  
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of the governments’ ability of revenue generation. Also, it indicates whether the 
governments are using debt to finance their expenditures since lower tax proceedings 
require higher borrowing. The tax components include the average rates, share of each 
component in overall tax revenue as well as in GDP. For the tax rates we used the 
implicit tax rates on labor, capital and consumption to reflect the personal income, capital 
income and value added taxes. Since there are several rates involved in some of the 
countries, the implicit rates can provide a good summary and reflect the real tax burden 
more accurately. Additionally, this provides the most comparable series for all transition 
countries under question. The averages from 2004-2007 period is utilized in the analysis 
to control for the affects of European Union; moreover we are more interested in 
explaining the current system by the macroeconomic structure and investment choices at 
the beginning of the transition.  
In terms of the macroeconomic underlying variables, we employed the share of 
informal sector as a percentage of GDP, ratio of inactivity or in other words, part of labor 
force that does not work but are not at their retirement age. The first measure is quite 
straightforward since it shows the extent of unrecorded economic activity, and a larger 
informal sector is argued to decrease the tax base; hence a change in the tax rates and 
composition. Our consideration of the inactive population at the working age emerges 
from the fact that particular transition countries have quite high levels of inactivity11. 
Undoubtedly to become inactive or to leave the labor market, the individuals need 
alternative incomes. And when the social policies are lacking to provide sufficient 
incomes12 to the inactive population, we can argue that these individuals are mostly 
absorbed by the informal sector. For robustness checks we also cluster the countries 
without inactivity rates. In the area of external capital, all the transition countries from the 
start tried to appeal to the foreign investors and to this purpose had produced strong 
incentive and promotion schemes. Incentive index consists of grants, free zones, and 
subsidies given by governments to foreign investors while promotion index looks at the 
number of promotion agencies and the extent of their activity. All the data is adopted 
                                                 
11 Activity rates range from 67.2% in Romania to 49.5% in Hungary for the earlier transition years. On 
average the activity rates are lower than the Western European sample.  
12 Although, the social spending is quite high in several transition countries like Hungary and Czech 
Republic, in Baltic States the public expenditures are rather low. For instance in Estonia, the ratio of social 
expenditures to GDP is 12.5%, which is well below the Western and transition country averages.  
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from Caas (2007)13. The higher incentive and promotion indices generally correspond 
with low tax burden on capital. Since the fiscal and financial incentives generated by 
these countries to draw foreign capital have tax regulations and tax rates in them, we only 
used the investment promotion scores in our empirical section. Again for robustness 
purposes we also look at actual capital flows and restrictions applied. For these indicators 
we took the average of the period between the earliest year available in 1990s and until 
1999. A certain time lag is required between the principal factors and the contemporary 
tax systems.  
The following section presents the cluster results graphically. Figure 4 explains 
the three groupings which were constructed by using squared Euclidean distance and 
Ward method14. From the dendogram, we can see that there are mainly three clusters; 
Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H) and Slovenia (SV) in the first group; Poland (P), and 
Slovakia (SK) in the second; Romania (R), Bulgaria (B), Lithuania (LI), Latvia (LA) and 
Estonia (E) in the third. In the first cluster, we can see that there is a lower degree of 
reliance on indirect taxes and higher rates of capital income taxes. The second cluster 
represents the intermediate cases. Baltic countries and the most recent EU members form 
the final cluster which exhibits very low rates of taxation on capital earnings and a much 
higher share of indirect taxes in the overall revenues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In his analysis, the overall index includes tax rates and tax breaks. Since capital taxation is a dependent 
variable in our paper, we leave out the tax related measures when computing the incentive and promotional 
indices.  
14 Ward’s method estimates the dissimilarity between any two clusters by the loss of information from 
joining the two clusters. The loss of information is measured by the increase in error sum of squares.   
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Figure 4. Dendrogram for Tax Variables 
 
Table 1 looks at the mean values for each variable and Table 2 presents the mean 
differences of each country groupings. The mean implicit tax rate on labor and capital in 
cluster 1 is much higher than the other two, indicating the importance of direct taxes. 
This can be also seen from the shares of each tax category among total taxes. Between 
Cluster 2 and 3, the implicit rate on labor is same but there is a big divergence among 
implicit tax rate on capital. As can be seen from the table 2 the greatest difference 
between the groups comes from the share of value added taxes and implicit rate on 
capital given the largest divergence of mean values. The lowest differences emanate from 
the share of taxes on capital indicating that all countries in the region put a relatively 
lower burden on this type of income.  
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Table 1. Cluster Means  
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Implicit Rate on Labor 39.3 33.0 33.0 
Share of PIT/Total Taxes 14.9 10.8 16.2 
Share of PIT/GDP 5.7 3.5 4.3 
Implicit Rate on Capital 21.6 19.8 10.7 
Share of CIT/Total Taxes 8.7 8.3 7.8 
Share of CIT/GDP 3.3 2.7 2.4 
Implicit Rate on 
Consumption 24.1 20.5 20.2 
Share of VAT/Total Taxes 20.9 24.0 28.4 
Share of VAT/GDP 7.9 7.7 8.7 
 
Table 2. Cluster Mean Differences 
 C1-C2 C1-C3 C2-C3 
Implicit Rate on Labor 6.4 6.3 0.0 
Share of PIT/Total Taxes 4.1 -1.3 -5.4 
Share of PIT/GDP 2.2 1.4 -0.8 
Implicit Rate on Capital 1.8 10.9 9.1 
Share of CIT/Total Taxes 0.4 0.9 0.5 
Share of CIT/GDP 0.6 0.9 0.3 
Implicit Rate on 
Consumption 3.6 3.9 0.3 
Share of VAT/Total Taxes -3.1 -7.6 -4.4 
Share of VAT/GDP 0.2 -0.8 -1.0 
 
Figure 5 repeats the clustering exercise for the informal sector and incentives for 
foreign capital. Still we observe three clusters but there is reordering of several countries. 
The first cluster has still Czech Republic and Hungary but Slovakia and Poland are also 
categorized here. In the second cluster we see, Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania. The 
third cluster includes Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria. These results show that there is a 
match between the extent of the shadow economy and willingness to attract foreign 
capital and tax systems, however, the overlap is far from perfect. Lithuania for example 
compared to other Baltic States has less informality while Romania and Bulgaria have 
extremely big informal sectors. These results do not change when non-employment rates 
are not included; nevertheless the results are not robust when we consider the restrictions 
on capital flows. This might suggest that while some countries encourage investment 
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promotion agencies, they at the same time have several restrictions on capital 
movements.  
 
Figure 5. Dendogram for Informal Economy and Foreign Investment  
 
              
 Table 3 presents the mean scores for each cluster. The share of informal sector 
and the rate of non-employment are highest in the third cluster whereas the first cluster 
has the greatest promotional activities on average. Both the restrictions and the actual 
capital flows are also the highest in this group indicating that the despite the qualitative 
limitations capital continued to come to these countries. Finally, the investment 
promotion activities are most extensive in the first cluster meaning that these nations 
attempted to draw external capital by convincing the potential investors.  
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 Table 3. Cluster Means for Structural Variables 
 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
 
Informal 22.67 30.6 38.4
Non-employment 42.5 40.1 46.54
Promotion 2.77 1.87 2.23
Capital Flows 43.98 44.29 58.74
Restrictions 70.31 62.64 71.9
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we evaluated the tax systems in the new EU member states by 
tracing the important reforms in three main components of government revenue sources; 
personal income, capital income, and value-added taxes. From early on, all countries 
adopted Western tax systems and radically transformed the previous regimes’ fiscal 
institutions. The transition countries share a number of common features in comparison 
to the old EU member states. Firstly, the direct taxes have a lower percentage in total tax 
proceedings. Secondly, the burden on capital earnings is relatively lower than the 
Western European standards. And finally, some of the countries in the region levy higher 
rates on personal incomes and especially on labor. Overall, the implicit tax rates on 
capital tend to be below while implicit tax rates on consumption is above the EU 
averages.  
Nevertheless, these countries experienced distinct changes in the fiscal realm, and 
from the very beginning of the transition implemented a variety of policies, which led to 
discrepancy across countries in terms of the share of each component in total tax 
revenues as well as the balance between direct and indirect sources. We identified three 
clear clusters; Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic in the first, Poland and Slovakia in the 
second, and Romania and Bulgaria and the Baltic States in the third group. In the first 
cluster, we can see that there is a lower degree of reliance on indirect taxes and higher 
rates of capital income taxes. The second cluster represents the intermediate cases. Baltic 
countries form the final cluster which exhibits very low rates of taxation on capital 
earnings and a much higher share of indirect taxes in the overall revenues.  
The visible differences between the countries is argued to be related to the 
underlying the structural characteristics of the economies, particularly the scope of the 
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informal economy and the intensity of competition to attract foreign capital. Informality 
cuts down the tax base in a country since many individuals and firms escape from the 
formal regulations. Also, since the governments would like to motivate actors to be 
relocated in the formal sector, taxes cannot be increased. In the case of incentives and 
promotions for foreign investments, the link is obvious. The foreign investors prefer 
lower taxes everything else being equal; hence states compete on the basis of this in the 
capital markets. Nevertheless, these countries also have other structural differences such 
as the underlying macroeconomic variables and the extent of their integration into the 
world commodity and capital markets. For instance, Baltic States and Poland suffer from 
high levels of unemployment throughout the transition, which reduced the income tax 
yields. Additionally, the share of service versus industrial sectors in the economy is 
distinct among the new EU member states, which affect the rate of capital taxation.  
Certainly, the cluster analysis is far from revealing the causal links between the 
macroeconomic conditions and tax systems. It merely tries to show the possible 
connections between these two sets of variables. Traditional regression techniques can be 
employed to investigate the concrete channels; however there are some data 
shortcomings and endogeneity issues that might impede the quality of regression 
techniques. Further research can try to overcome these difficulties as well as try to 
inspect if the stated relationships hold for other countries, especially other developing and 
post-communist nations who saw significant changes in their tax systems as well. 
Another addition can be analyzing the effects of tax systems on informal sector and 
foreign capital.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Major Tax Reforms in Personal Income, Corporate Income, and Value Added Taxes 
Country PIT CIT VAT 
Czech Republic 1994: 6 rates 15, 20, 25, 32, 40, 44% 
1996: abolition of 40% rate 
1997: abolition of 44% rate, restoring of 
40% rate 
2000: abolition of 40% rate 
2008: flat rate 15% 
1991: 55% 
1993: 45%;  
1994 – 1998 gradual reduction of 
the rate to: 35% 
2000: reduction of the rate to 31% 
2004: 28% rate 
2008: flat rate 20% 
1993: standard rate 23%, 
reduced rate 5%;  
1995: standard rate reduced to 
22% 
2004: single 19% rate, lowering 
of registration threshold  
Estonia 1993: 3 rates 16, 24 and 33% 
1994: flat rate 26% 
1991: 3 rates 15, 23 and 30% 
1992: single 35% rate 
1994: rate lowered to 26% 
2000 – abolition of the tax  
1991: 10% rate 
1992: standard rate 18%,  
1994: limiting of exemptions 
2000: reduced rate 5% 
Lithuania 1991: rates from 18 to 33% 
1994: single 33% rate 
1991: basic rate 29% 
2000: rate lowered to 24% 
1994: VAT basic rate 18%, 
reduced rate 9% 
2000 – reduced rate 5% 
2001 – second reduced rate 9% 
Latvia 1991: 5 rates from 15 to 35% 
1997: flat rate 25% 
1991: 3 rates 15, 25 and 35% 
1993: basic rate 25% and higher 
rates for financial sector and trade 
1995 – single 25% rates 
2001– rate reduced to 22% 
1992: 10% turnover tax  
1992–1993 rate raised to 12% 
and 18% 
1995: VAT standard rate 18% 
2003 – reduced rate 9% 
Poland 1991 – 3 rates 20, 30 and 40% 
1994 – rates raised to 21, 33 and 45% 
1997–1998 – top rate reduced to 44% and 
40% 
1999: 3 rates 19, 30 and 40% 
1992 –40% rate, 
1998–2002 – gradual reduction of 
the rate to 27% 
2004– rate lowered to 19% 
1993: standard rate 22%, 
reduced rate 7% and numerous 
exemptions,  
1994–2002 – gradual curtailing 
of exemptions  
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Slovakia 1993: 6 rates from 15 to47%;  
1994: top rate reduced to 42%; 
1999: 7 rates from 15 to 47%;  
2001: top rate reduced to 42%; 
2002: 5 rates from 10 to 38%;  
2004: flat 19% rate 
1993: 45% rate;  
1994: rate reduced to 40%;  
2000: rate reduced to 29%;  
2001: rate reduced to 25%;  
2004: rate reduced to 19% 
1993: standard rate 23%, 
reduced rate 6%;  
1999: reduced rate raised to 
10%;  
2003: standard rate 20%, 
reduced rate 14%;  
2004: single 19% rate 
Slovenia 1993: 6 rates 17, 35, 37, 40, 45 and 50%, 1994: 30% 
1996: 25% 
1999: standard rate 19% 
reduced rate 8% 
2002 –reduced rate 8,5% 
Hungary 1988: 10 rates: 20, 25, 30, 35, 39, 44, 48, 
52, 56 and 60% 
1990: 4 rates 15, 30, 40, 50% 
1992: 3 rates: 25, 35 and 40% 
1994: 2 rates added: 20 and 44% 
1997: 6 rates: 20, 22, 31, 35, 39, and 42%
1999: 3 rates 20, 30 and 40%,  
1989: 40 and 50% rates 
1990: rates reduced to 35 and 40% 
1991: 40% rate 
1994: 36% 
1995: 18% rate;  
2002: limiting of investment 
deductions  with turnover up to 15 
million HUF, 15% rate 
2004: 16% rate 
1988: 3 rates 0, 15 and 25% 
1993: standard rate 25%, 
reduced rate first 6, then 10% 
1995: reduced rate raised to 
12% 
Bulgaria 1992: 6 rates 20%, 24%, 28%, 32%, 36% 
and 40% 
4 rates from 20% to 40%,  
2002: rates from 0% to 29% 
2008: flat rate 10% 
2000: 25% rate, 20% for small 
businesses 
2002: 23.5% rate 
2008: flat rate 10% 
1994: 22% rate,  
1999: reduced to 20%; 
exemptions 
Romania  2003: 5 rates: 18%, 23%, 28%, 34% and 
40% 
2005: 16% 
Up to 2000: 38% 
2000: 25% rate  
2005: 16% 
1993: 22% rate and 11% 
reduced rate; 
2003: 19% rate and 9% 
reduced rate, exemptions: 
financial and public utility 
services 
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